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Non-technical summary  
 
There are different reasons, why countries trade. The most important one, economists typical-
ly refer to, is that trade is a source of wealth. There is, however, a further reason, which usual-
ly is not mentioned in the economic literature, but is in the center of this analysis. Since the 
impact of global warming considerably varies across countries, trade is a kind of insurance 
against the risks of climate change. For example, if in some region because of weather ex-
tremes food production is reduced, over the short-run the resulting losses might be substituted 
by imports. Over the long-run production could even shift to regions, which have the compar-
ative advantage of being less vulnerable to climate change and variability. Seen in this way, 
trade is a means to adapt to the increasing risks of global warming. 
 
Moderating climate impacts is one side of the coin. The second one is that trade can spread 
the cost of climate change across regions. After six years of drought Australia’s rice produc-
tion almost collapsed in 2008. This was one of several factors contributing to a doubling of 
the world market price of rice, which led to panicked hoarding and violent protests in low 
income countries. In other words, output losses in a single region might cause higher world 
market prices, and the resulting terms-of-trade effects could pertain to real income losses in 
almost any country.  In countries, where direct impacts of climate change are relatively mod-
erate and where sufficient financial and technical resources for adaptation exist, terms-of-
trade effects can be responsible for a significant fraction of a country’s total costs from cli-
mate change. This provides an argument to policy makers, why funding adaptation in the poor 
developing countries can be in the self-interest of the rich, industrialized ones. 
 
This is to our knowledge the first paper which analyses in a systematic manner the interaction 
between adaptation to climate change, international trade and terms-of-trade effects in a sim-
ple model. It has three messages mainly:  First, trade can be viewed as a kind of adaptation to 
climate change and variability, as trade can help to reduce direct impacts of global climate 
change on a region’s welfare. In particular, the less affected and the richer nations are, the 
more they can profit from moderating the impacts of global climate change through trade. 
Second, if regions are rich enough to adapt optimally to climate change, the resulting alloca-
tion of adaptation measures is Pareto-efficient. In this case funding of adaptation does not 
make sense from an economic perspective. Finally, since the regions of the South typically 
lack the resources for adapting optimally to climate change, because of terms of trade effects, 
it might be in the self-interest of the industrialized nations to fund adaptation in the develop-
ing part of the world. However, providing financial assistance for adaptation can be Pareto-
improving only, if the benefits of funding, i.e., damages, which are moderated through adapta-
tion, are big enough, and hence, if the recipient’s own expenditure for adaptation is low. If 
not, the paradoxical effect of recipient immiserization through tied transfers can occur. 
  
 
 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
 
Die Gründe, weshalb Staaten miteinander handeln, sind vielfältig. Als wichtigsten Grund be-
rufen sich Ökonomen seit Ricardo meistens auf die wohlfahrtsfördernde Wirkung von interna-
tionalem Handel für die involvierten Staaten. Daneben gibt es aber einen weiteren Grund, der 
in der ökonomischen Literatur meistens ignoriert wird, hier aber im Zentrum der Analyse ste-
hen soll. Da sich die Klimaschäden zwischen unterschiedlichen Ländern stark unterscheiden, 
kann Handel als eine Art von Versicherung gegen die Risiken des Klimawandels fungieren. 
Führen beispielsweise häufigere Wetterextreme in einem Land zu einem Rückgang der Le-
bensmittelproduktion, kann das in der kurzen Frist durch eine Importausweitung ausgeglichen 
werden. In der langen Frist kann die Lebensmittelproduktion sogar in Länder, die durch ge-
ringere Klimavulnerabilität einen komparativen Vorteil haben, verlagert werden. In diesem 
Sinne kann vermehrter internationaler Handel als Anpassungsmaßnahme an den Klimawandel 
interpretiert werden. 
 
Die Reduktion von Klimaschäden ist die eine Seite der Medaille. Auf der anderen Seite kann 
internationaler Handel die Auswirkungen des Klimawandels auf andere Regionen übertragen. 
Nach sechs Jahren der Trockenheit ist Australiens Reisproduktion 2008 fast vollständig zu-
sammengebrochen. Das gilt als einer von verschiedenen Faktoren, die zu einer Verdoppelung 
des Weltmarktpreises und schließlich zu gewaltsamen Ausschreitungen in mehreren Entwick-
lungsländern führten. Das zeigt, dass Produktionsausfälle in einem Land zu höheren Welt-
marktpreisen führen und die resultierenden Terms-of-Trade Effekte reale Einkommensverlus-
te in anderen Staaten verursachen können. In Ländern, die nur geringe direkte Klimaschäden 
zu erwarten haben und die über genügend Mittel zur Anpassung verfügen, können solche 
Terms-of-Trade Effekte für einen signifikanten Teil der totalen Klimakosten verantwortlich 
sein. Die Finanzierung von Anpassungsmaßnahmen in Entwicklungsländern kann aus diesem 
Grund im Eigeninteresse der Industriestaaten liegen. 
 
Diese Studie ist nach unserem Wissen die erste, die systematisch die Interaktion zwischen 
Anpassung, internationalem Handel und Terms-of-Trade Effekten untersucht. Drei Punkte 
sind von besonderer Relevanz: Erstens, internationaler Handel hilft den stark betroffenen Re-
gionen die Klimakosten zu reduzieren, Zweitens, sind Regionen wohlhabend genug sich an 
den Klimawandel anzupassen ist die Finanzierung von Anpassungsmaßnahmen durch andere 
Staaten wirkungslos. Drittens, da die Entwicklungsländer oft nicht genügend Mittel haben, 
sich genügend anzupassen, kann es durch die erwähnten Terms-of-Trade Effekte für die In-
dustrieländer Sinn machen, solche Anpassungsanstrengungen finanziell zu unterstützen. Sol-
che Unterstützung ist aber nur Pareto-verbessernd wenn die Klimaschäden hoch  und die Res-
sourcen des Empfängerlandes gering sind. Andernfalls kann es zum paradoxen Ergebnis 
kommen, dass die Finanzierung von Anpassungsmaßnahmen für das Empfängerland zu 
Wohlfahrtsverlusten führt. 
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Abstract 
This paper has three messages mainly, which are observed in a simple model of climate 
change, international trade and regional adaptation. First, trade can be viewed as a kind of 
adaptation to climate change and variability, as trade can help to reduce direct impacts of 
global climate change on a region’s welfare. In particular, the less affected and the richer na-
tions are, the more they can profit from moderating the impacts of global climate change 
through trade. Second, if regions are rich enough to adapt optimally to climate change, the 
resulting allocation of adaptation measures is Pareto-efficient. In this case funding of adapta-
tion, which is an element of international climate policy, does not make sense from an eco-
nomic perspective. Third, since the regions of the South typically lack the resources for adapt-
ing optimally to climate change, because of terms of trade effects, it might be in the self-
interest of the industrialized nations to fund adaptation in the developing part of the world. 
However, providing financial assistance for adaptation can be Pareto-improving only, if the 
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1 Introduction 
There are different reasons, why countries trade. The most important one, economists typical-
ly refer to, is that trade is a source of wealth. There is, however, a further reason, which usual-
ly is not mentioned in the economic literature, but is in the center of this analysis. Since the 
impact, global warming can have on regional societies, considerably varies across countries, 
trade is a kind of insurance against the risks of climate change and variability. For example, if 
in some region because of weather extremes food production is reduced, over the short-run 
the resulting losses might be substituted by imports. Over the long-run production could even 
shift to regions, which have the comparative advantage of being less vulnerable to climate 
change and variability. Seen in this way, trade is a means to adapt to the increasing risks of 
global warming (see Julia and Duchin, 2007). 
Moderating climate impacts is one side of the coin. The second one is that trade can spread 
the cost of climate change across regions. Here is a recent example. After six years of drought 
Australia’s rice production almost collapsed in 2008. This was one of several factors contrib-
uting to a doubling of the world market price of rice, which led to panicked hoarding and vio-
lent protests in low income countries (see Bradsher, 2008). In other words, output losses in a 
single region might cause higher world market prices, and the resulting terms-of-trade effects 
could pertain to real income losses in almost any country. This is a problem for the poorest in 
particular. Typically, these countries are heavily exposed to climate change, but they neither 
own the resources for coping with the associated risks, nor are they able to cover increasing 
expenses for imports through increasing their exports (see Cline, 2007). 
Both the direct impacts and the terms-of-trade-effects depend on the societies’ vulnerability to 
climate change. In particular, the less sensitive production in export oriented sectors is to cli-
mate change, and the less dependent a country is on imports of vulnerable goods, the lower 
will be the term-of-trade effects. Consequently, investing into measures for reducing vulnera-
bility seems in the interest of countries. On the one hand this could be mitigation, which refers 
to policy interventions such as the reduction of anthropogenic greenhouse gases emissions. 
On the other hand it could be adaptation, which refers to investment into processes, practices, 
or structures to moderate or offset potential damages of global climate change, as well as to 
reduce the climate vulnerability of communities, regions, or countries (see Parry et al., 2007).  
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Some adaptation is done autonomously by the market; some has the property of a regional 
public good and requires strategic investment. Many poor countries, however, lack the capa-
bility to adapt. This is not only because they are short of financial resources. Poor countries 
typically have weaker market institutions, and their governments routinely undersupply local 
public goods. Therefore, it must be expected that without financial and technical assistance 
climate change will pronounce the existing inequalities between the industrialized and the 
developing world (see Barrett, 2008). For that reason three adaptation funds have been estab-
lished at the 2001 COP6 meeting: (1) the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF), which 
aims to support the 49 least developed countries, (2) the Special Climate Change Fund 
(SCCF), which provides financial support to all developing countries, and (3) the Adaptation 
Fund, which is based on Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol (for details, see Dellink et al., 
2009). And the Green Climate Fund (GCF), which has the goal to provide 100 billion US 
Dollar annually for mitigation and adaptation activities in developing countries, came closer 
to start operating at the recent COP17 meeting in Durban, South Africa.  
Despite of that till today the contributions of industrialized countries are small compared to 
the financial resources, the developing countries need for adapting efficiently to global cli-
mate change. As Buob and Stephan (2011) discuss, one reason might be that as long as there 
is no international cooperation in the solution of the global climate problem, and as long as 
mitigation is voluntary, both the industrialized and the developing countries have low interest 
in funding adaptation. More precisely Buob and Stephan observe a paradox in the following 
sense: For economic reasons industrialized countries will financially assist adaptation in de-
veloping ones only, if the burden of mitigation is shifted from the developed to the developing 
countries, which, however, will harm the South's welfare. 
As is often the case in game theory settings, Buob and Stephan (2011) neglect international 
trade. But terms-of-trade effects can be important for at least two reasons. First, as Schenker 
(2010) shows, in countries, where direct impacts of climate change are relatively moderate 
and where sufficient financial and technical resources for adaptation exist, terms-of-trade ef-
fects are responsible for a significant fraction of a country’s total costs from climate change. 
This not only reinforces what we already stated above, namely that investing into measures 
for reducing own vulnerability seems in the interest of countries. It also provides an argument 
to policy makers, why funding adaptation in the poor developing countries can be in the self-
interest of the rich, industrialized ones. 
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Second, providing technical and financial assistance for adapting to the risk of climate change 
can be viewed as a kind of tied transfer from industrialized to developing countries. Since the 
pioneering work of Bhagwati et al. (1983) it is recognized that terms-of-trade deterioration 
could lead to what literature calls a transfer paradox. That means, (1) a donor country might 
gain by giving aid to a recipient country, which then loses welfare through this transfer, and 
(2), changes in the international terms-of-trade caused by a transfer is the principal reason for 
such perverse results. This paper contributes to this literature, but is to our knowledge the first 
one, which in a systematic manner analyses the interaction between adaptation to climate 
change, international trade and terms-of-trade effects.  
Generally it is argued that climate policy requires a long-term perspective. Undeniable this 
applies, if mitigation is the policy option under consideration, where, because of the inertia of 
the climate system, costs are borne early, but benefits accrue in the distant future. For the 
same reason it should be clear, however, that the climate will change, even if greenhouse gas 
emissions are drastically reduced immediately. In what follows, we take global climate 
change as given. One argument is that we adopt a mid-term perspective. A second one could 
be that an internationally coordinated mitigation policy exists, by which the development of 
the atmospheric greenhouse gas concentration is exogenously determined. Based on this as-
sumption Section 2 presents a simple analytical framework, which is designed to analyze the 
interaction between global climate change, adaptation and international trade. Section 3 dis-
cusses three different cases: (1) the pure trade effect of climate change, (2) optimal autono-
mous adaptation, and (3) funding adaptation in the presence of international trade. Section 4 
concludes. 
2 A North-South model of climate change, trade and adaptation 
In the following we develop a static model of climate change, adaptation expenditures and 
international trade. Economic activities differ with respect to their sensitivity to climate 
change. For example, agricultural production is more responsive to climate change and 
weather extremes than manufacturing cars or personal computers. Furthermore, the impact of 
climate change will be larger and more harmful in the developing countries of the South than 
in the industrialized ones in the North. This follows mainly from limited adaptive capacities, 
and since the fraction of economic activities, which are at risk of climate change disruption, is 
larger in poor than in rich countries (see Adger et al., 2003). Taken together this motivates (1) 
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to discriminate between sectors and commodities, which are vulnerable to climate change, 
and those which are not, and (2), to divide the world economy into at least two regions: North 
(ܰ) and South (ܵ). North corresponds to the OECD countries and represents a region of rela-
tively high wealth, but relatively low exposure to climate change. South is an acronym for the 
developing part of the world, which is poor, but highly vulnerable to climate change.  
Let vulnerable be the nickname for the aggregate of goods and services, which are produced 
in climate sensitive sectors such as agriculture, animal husbandry, water supply or forestry. 
Vulnerable and capital are traded on open international markets, and both are inputs into the 
regions’ gross production. Thereby, gross production of region n is characterized by a linear 
homogenous function	 ௡݂ሺݔ௡, ݇௡ሻ, where ݔ௡ and ݇௡ are the inputs of vulnerable and capital, 
respectively.  
The production of vulnerable is described by cost functions. Costs are expressed in units of 
gross output and are a strictly increasing function ݃௡ሺܳ, ܽ௡, ݖ௡ሻ	of the output ݖ௡	and impacts 
of climate change, which in turn depend on two parameters: (1) the global climate, which is 
represented by atmospheric carbon concentration Q, and (2), the region’s expenditure ܽ௡ for 
regional adaptation. That means, the higher is the atmospheric carbon concentration Q and the 
lower is the region’s investment ܽ௡ into adaptation measures, the higher will the regional cli-
mate impact and hence the costs for producing a certain output of vulnerable goods and ser-
vices. More precisely, we assume1 
Assumption 1:  
 డ௙೙డ௫೙ ൐ 0,
డమ௙೙
డ௫೙మ ൏ 0,
డ௙೙
డ௞೙ ൐ 0,
డమ௙೙
డ௞೙మ ൏ 0,	 
߲݃௡
߲ܳ ൐ 0,
߲ଶ݃௡
߲ܳଶ ൐ 0,
߲݃௡
߲ܽ௡ ൏ 0,
߲ଶ݃
߲ܽ௡ଶ ൐ 0,
߲݃௡
߲ݖ௡ ൐ 0,
߲ଶ݃
߲ݖ௡ଶ ൐ 0, 
 
డమ௚೙
డொడ௔೙ ൌ 	
డమ௚೙
డ௔೙డொ ൏ 0,
డమ௚೙
డொడ௭೙ 	ൌ 	
డమ௚೙
డ௭೙డொ ൐ 0,
డమ௚೙
డ௔೙డ௭೙ ൌ 	
డమ௚೙
డ௭೙డ௔೙ ൏ 0. 
As such costs of producing vulnerable are strictly increasing with atmospheric carbon concen-
tration and decreasing, but at declining rate with adaptation expenditure. Moreover, the more 
                                                      
1  For illustrative purposes let ݃௡ሺܳ, ܽ௡, ݖ௡ሻ ൌ 	 ݖ௡ଶሾ1 ൅ ߠ௡ሺ	ܳ െ ܽ௡ሻሿ,  where ߠ௡ᇱ ൐ 0, ߠ௡ᇱᇱ ൐ 0. 
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is invested into adaptation the lower is the marginal impact of climate change on costs of ex-
porting vulnerable, while climate change intensifies the cost reduction effect of adaptation. 
At this point, three remarks on our modeling of climate impacts and adaptation seem justified. 
First, our analysis focuses on market impacts only, i.e., impacts of climate change, which can 
be expressed in terms of losses (or gains) in the regions’ ability to produce private goods in 
vulnerable sectors. This implies that in contrast to the majority of the literature on interaction 
between international trade and the environment (for example, see Copeland and Taylor, 
2005) we are neglecting non-market damages, i.e., impacts of climate change such as species 
losses, for which no market value exists.2 Second, as already mentioned above, adaptation 
covers a wide range variety of measures, such as building of dykes, installing of early warning 
systems or the shifting to more heat and drought resistant crops. There exists no common met-
ric for these diverse measures. Therefore, similar to Ebert and Welsch (2011), expenditure for 
investing into adaptation measures is used as argument in the cost function of vulnerable. Fi-
nally, climate change results from the accumulation of carbon dioxide and other greenhouses 
gases in the atmosphere and primarily materializes in three forces, which affect economic 
activities: mean or seasonal temperature change, changes in mean or seasonal precipitation 
and sea level rise. As was shown by Mendelssohn et al. (2006) in contrast to atmospheric car-
bon concentration precipitation as well as temperature change very much depends on the geo-
graphical location. Given the high level of abstraction, it seems reasonable therefore to repre-
sent global climate change through changes in the atmospheric stock of carbon dioxide and 
capture differences in regional patterns through region specified costs functions. 
Each region can invest in its own as well as the other region’s adaptation. I.e., ܽ௡ ൌ 	ܽ௡௡ ൅
	ܽ௡௦ , where ܽ௡௡ denotes own adaptation expenditure and ܽ௡௦  is the investment of region ݏ into 
adaptation measures of region	݊. Suppose further that the world markets both for vulnerable 
and capital are in equilibrium 
(2.1) ݖே ൅ ݖௌ െ ݔே െ ݔௌ ൌ 0, 
(2.2) ܭே ൅ ܭௌ െ ݇ே െ ݇ௌ ൌ 0, 
                                                      
2  Non-market damages are by definition damages which are not directly expressed in units of a national ac-
counting system. As such non-market damages are not transmitted by changes in economic variables as pric-
es, but use rather different channels as the media, etc. 
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where ܭ௡ denotes the exogenously given capital stock of region ݊ ൌ ܰ, ܵ. 
Let ݌ and ݎ denote the world market price of vulnerable and capital, respectively. Gross pro-
duction can be consumed domestically and might be used to cover the costs of investing into 
adaptation as well as of producing vulnerable. Therefore, for any region ݊ the budget con-
straint is  
(2.3) ܿ௡ ൌ ௡݂ሺݔ௡, ݇௡ሻ െ ݃௡ሺܳ, ܽ௡, ݖ௡ሻ െ	ܽ௡௡ െ ܽ௦௡ ൅ ݌ሺݖ௡ െ ݔ௡ሻ ൅ ݎሺܭ௡ െ ݇௡ሻ, 
where ܿ௡ is domestic consumption. ݌ሺݖ௡ െ ݔ௡ሻ and ݎሺܭ௡ െ ݇௡ሻ are the net-deficits from trad-
ing vulnerable and capital, respectively. 
3 Analysis   
Let sectors behave as price takers. Then profit maximization leads to the following optimality 
conditions for an interior solution, which are both sufficient and necessary 
(3.1)  డ௙೙డ௫೙ ሺݔ௡, ݇௡ሻ െ ݌ ൌ 0, ݊ ൌ ܰ, ܵ, 
(3.2)  ݌ െ డ௚೙డ௭೙ ሺܳ, ܽ௡, ݖ௡ሻ ൌ 0, ݊ ൌ ܰ, ܵ, 
(3.3)  డ௙೙డ௞೙ ሺݔ௡, ݇௡ሻ െ ݎ ൌ 0, ݊ ൌ ܰ, ܵ, 
Condition (3.1) and (3.2) together state that the marginal productivity of vulnerable equals the 
world market price, which in turn is equal to the marginal costs of producing vulnerable. 
Condition (3.3) implies that the marginal productivity of capital has to be identical across re-
gions. 
These conditions allow to define (1) exports ݖ௡ ൌ ܼ௡ሺܳ, ܽ௡, ݌ሻ as function of the world mar-
ket price ݌ and the regional climate impact ሺܳ, ܽ௡ሻ, (2) imports ݔ௡ ൌ ܺ௡ሺ	݌, ݇௡ሻ as function 
of price ݌ and capital inputs ݇௡ , and (3), capital inputs ݇௡ ൌ 	ܭ௡ሺݎ, ݔ௡ሻ as function of the 
world capital market price r and vulnerable inputs ݔ௡, respectively. 
Based on this and by taking the total differential of condition (2.1) we get after some manipu-
lations (see Appendix, Proposition 1) 
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(3.4) ܣ݀݌ ൌ 	ቀడ௭ಿడொ ൅
డ௭ೄ
డொ ቁ ݀ܳ ൅	
డ௭ಿ
డ௔ಿ ݀ܽே ൅
డ௭ೄ
డ௔ೄ ݀ܽௌ, 
where ܣ ൌ ሺడ௫ಿడ௣ ൅
డ௫ೄ
డ௣ െ
డ௭ಿ
డ௣ െ
డ௭ೄ
డ௣ ሻ is the slope of the world excess demand function of vul-
nerable. Since the slope is negative, climate change as well as regional adaptation affects the 
terms-of-trade: the higher (lower) is the impact of climate change on the regions’ production 
of vulnerable, the less (more) will be exported, and hence, the world market price will rise 
(fall). 
As condition (3.4) suggests (for a proof, see Appendix, Corollary 1), there will be no realloca-
tion of capital across regions, if atmospheric carbon concentration and/or adaptation expendi-
ture change only marginally. Intuitively, this can be explained as follows. Suppose that the 
initial capital endowment ܭ௡, ݊ ൌ ܰ, ܵ, corresponds to the equilibrium stocks, i.e., suppose 
that the marginal productivity of capital initially is identical across regions. Global climate 
change, which does not directly affect capital inputs, will cause a reallocation of capital be-
tween regions only, if it induces differences in the regions’ rate of return on capital. Now, 
consider  
 ݀ డ௙೙డ௞೙ ሺݔ௡, ݇௡ሻ ൌ
డమ௙೙
డ௞೙మ ݀݇௡ ൅
డమ௙೙
డ௞೙డ௫೙ ݀ݔ௡, 
and recall that ݇௡ ൌ 	ܭ௡ሺݎ, ݔ௡ሻ, hence ݀݇௡ ൌ డ௞೙డ௫೙ ݀ݔ௡ ൅
డ௞೙
డ௥ ݀ݎ. By using conditions (A1) and 
(A3) (see Appendix) we observe  
 ݀ డ௙೙డ௞೙ ሺݔ௡, ݇௡ሻ ൌ ݀ݎ, ݊ ൌ ܰ, ܵ. 
Consequently, since all sectors and regions behave as price takers, climate change will not 
lead to a reallocation of capital across regions. 
An immediate consequence is that inputs of vulnerable into regional production are not direct-
ly affected by climate change, i.e., 
 ௗ௫೙ௗொ ൌ
డ௫೙
డ௣
ௗ௣
ௗொ ൏ 0, ݊ ൌ ܰ, ܵ. 
There are, however, indirect effects. For, if the world market price of vulnerable rises due to 
global climate change, less will be put into regional production.  
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3.1 Trade as adaptation measure: the pure trade effect 
In what follows, let us assume that there is no additional expenditure for adaptation, neither in 
the North nor in the South, i.e. ݀ܽ௡ ൌ 0, n = N,S. Then condition (3.4) turns into 
(3.4a)  ௗ௣ௗொ ൌ 	
ቀങ೥ಿങೂ ା
ങ೥ೄ
ങೂ ቁ
ങೣಿ
ങ೛ ା
ങೣೄ
ങ೛ ି
ങ೥ಿ
ങ೛ ି
ങ೥ೄ
ങ೛
൐ 0, 
whereas condition (3.2) implies (see Appendix, conditions (A5), (A6)) 
 ௗ௭೙	ௗொ ൌ
డ௭೙
డொ ൅
డ௭೙
డ௣
ௗ௣
ௗொ. 
The first expression on the right represents the direct impact of climate change on exports of 
vulnerable, which is negative. The second one reflects trade effects and is positive (see 
(3.4a)). As such, the overall effect depends upon which of the two dominates. Moreover we 
have 
(3.5)  ௗሺ௭೙ି௫೙ሻௗொ ൌ
డ௭೙
డொ ൅ ቀ
డ௭೙
డ௣ െ
డ௫೙
డ௣ ቁ
ௗ௣
ௗொ ൌ
డ௭೙
డொ ቈ
ങೣೞ
ങ೛ ି
ങ೥ೞ	
ങ೛
ങೣಿ
ങ೛ ା
ങೣೄ
ങ೛ ି
ങ೥ಿ
ങ೛ ି
ങ೥ೄ
ങ೛
቉ ൅ డ௭ೞడொ ቈ
ങ೥೙
ങ೛ ି
ങೣ೙	
ങ೛
ങೣಿ
ങ೛ ା
ങೣೄ
ങ೛ ି
ങ೥ಿ
ങ೛ ି
ങ೥ೄ
ങ೛
቉. 
Given conditions (A2), (A5) and (A6) (see Appendix) the first expression on the right hand is 
negative, while the second one is positive. 
As mentioned above, countries in the North are less vulnerable to climate change that those in 
the South. Mendelsohn et al. (2006) predict that the poor countries of the South will suffer the 
largest part of the damages from climate change. Although adaptation, economic wealth, and 
technology may take influence on how market damages are distributed across countries, over 
the mid-term regional market impacts of global warming are essential zero in the US, Japan 
and Russia. India and many other low-income countries, however, might be confronted with 
significant losses. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that over the mid-term the direct mar-
ket impact of climate change on the production of vulnerable commodities is almost negligi-
ble in the North. I.e., let us assume for a moment   
Assumption 2: If the global climate changes only slightly, impacts of climate change on costs 
of producing vulnerable outputs are zero in the North, but positive in the South. 
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Expressed in technical terms, Assumption 2 means that డ௚ಿడொ ൌ 0, hence 	
డమ௚ಿ
డொడ௭ಿ 	ൌ 	
డమ௚ಿ
డ௭ಿడொ ൌ 0 
and డ௭ಿడொ ൌ 0 (see (A6)). This implies that in contrast to the North, the South, where direct ef-
fects matter, will now reduce its output of vulnerable. Or to phrase it differently, there is a 
change in the terms-of-trade in favor of the North. For if we apply Assumption 2, condition 
(3.5) gives 
  ௗሺ௭ಿ	ି௫ಿ	ሻௗொ ൐ 0	 and  
ௗሺ௭ೄ	ି௫ೄ	ሻ
ௗொ ൏ 0. 
Finally, let us consider how climate change affects regional welfare. Since welfare depends on 
consumption only, welfare can directly be measured in units of consumption. By differentiat-
ing totally, we get from condition (2.3) 
 ݀ܿ௡ ൌ 	െ డ௚೙డொ ݀ܳ ൅ 	݀݌ሺݖ௡ െ ݔ௡ሻ, ݊ ൌ ܰ, ܵ. 
The first term on the right hand side represents the direct effect, climate change has on re-
gional welfare, and which typically is non-positive. The second term on the right hand side 
represents terms-of-trade effects. Now, since climate change implies rising world market pric-
es, this effect is negative and accentuates the negative direct impacts, if region n is net im-
porter of vulnerable, i.e., ሺݖ௡ െ ݔ௡ሻ ൏ 0. However, if region n is net-exporter of vulnerable, 
then term-of-trade effects are positive and might offset the negative direct impact of climate 
change. In other words, if the South were net-exporter of vulnerable, and if the terms-of-trade 
effects are high enough, this could even overcompensate the direct impact of climate change. 
3.2 Optimal autonomous adaptation 
Next let us assume that both regions own the necessary resources to autonomously adapt to 
climate change. If adaptation is optimal in region n = N,S, then Kuhn-Tucker conditions im-
ply  
(3.6)  ሺడ௚೙డ௔೙ ൅ 	1ሻܽ௡ ൌ 0. 
This indicates that in absence of budget constraints, in case of adaptation marginal adaptation 
expenditure equals marginal benefits, i.e., the marginal impact of adaptation on the costs of 
producing vulnerable. Since we explicitly discern between costs (expenditure) and benefits of 
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adaptation, i.e., effects of adaptation on costs of producing vulnerable, we are able to define a 
total cost function 
 ݄௡ ൌ ݃௡ሺܳ, ܽ௡, ݖ௡ሻ ൅	ܽ௡. 
Taking the total differential gives 
 ௗ௛೙ௗொ ൌ 	
డ௚೙
డொ ൅	ቀ
డ௚೙
డ௔೙ ൅ 	1ቁ
ௗ௔೙
ௗொ ൅	
డ௚೙
డ௭೙
ௗ௭೙
ௗொ . 
Because of condition (3.6) this indicates that in case of optimal adaptation marginal produc-
tion costs entailed by climate change do not include adaptation costs. They are determined by 
(1) residual damages of climate change, or as Tulkens and van Steenberghe (2009) phrase it, 
marginal suffering costs, and (2), by the marginal change in total costs of producing vulnera-
ble because of a marginal change in exports of vulnerable. 
Condition (3.6) furthermore indicates that if both regions are optimally adapted to climate 
change, then marginal benefits of adaptation are identical across regions. This is a sufficient 
and necessary condition for Pareto-efficiency in the allocation of adaption to global climate 
change as immediately follows from solving (see (2.3)) 
 max	ሼ ே݂ሺݔே, ݇ேሻ െ ݃ேሺܳ, ܽே, ݖேሻ ൅	 ௌ݂ሺݔௌ, ݇ௌሻ െ ݃ௌሺܳ, ܽௌ, ݖௌሻ െ	ܽே െ ܽௌሽ 
subject to conditions (2.1) and (2.2). The explanation is obvious. Both, benefits and costs of 
adaptation are regionally private. This means, seen from a global perspective, adaptation is 
private to the single region, and hence, if each region autonomously is optimally adapted to 
climate change, the resulting allocation must be optimal globally. Consequently, funding ad-
aptation is not Pareto improving. In contrast, funding adaptation will crowd out autonomous 
adaptation and works like an income transfer only. 
This becomes obvious, if we look at condition (3.6), which implicitly defines optimal auton-
omous adaptation ܽ௡௡ ൌ ܣ௡ሺܳ, ݖ௡, ܽ௡௦ሻ  as function of atmospheric carbon concentration Q, 
exports ݖ௡ and foreign expenditure ܽ௡௦  for adaptation in region n. Totally differentiating con-
ditions (3.2) and (3.6) implies 
  ݀ݖ௡ ൌ 		 డ௭೙డ௔೙ ሺ݀ܽ௡
௦ ൅ ݀ܽ௡௡ሻ ൅	డ௭೙డொ ݀ܳ ൅
డ௭೙
డ௣ ݀݌,   
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  ݀ܽ௡௡ ൅ ݀ܽ௡௦ ൌ 	 డ௔೙డ௭೙ ݀ݖ௡ ൅		
డ௔೙
డொ ݀ܳ, 
which gives  
(3.7)  ቀ1 െ డ௔೙డ௭೙
డ௭೙
డ௔೙ቁ ݀ݖ௡ ൌ ሺ
డ௭೙
డொ ൅	
డ௭೙
డ௔೙
డ௔೙
డொ ሻ݀ܳ ൅	
డ௭೙
డ௣ ݀݌, 
(3.8)  ቀ1 െ డ௔೙డ௭೙
డ௭೙
డ௔೙ቁ ሺ݀ܽ௡
௡ ൅ 	݀ܽ௡௦ሻ ൌ ቀడ௔೙డொ ൅
డ௔೙
డ௭೙
డ௭೙
డொ ቁ ݀ܳ ൅	
డ௭೙
డ௣
డ௔೙
డ௭೙ ݀݌. 
Both conditions indicate that optimal autonomous adaptation as well as the exports of vulner-
able is driven by climate change as well as changes in terms-of-trade. As the first bracket on 
the right hand side of condition (3.7) shows, climate change has two opposite effects on the 
exports of vulnerable: a direct and negative one, since climate change raises the costs of pro-
ducing vulnerable (see (A.6)), and an indirect, but positive one, since climate change stipu-
lates adaptation expenditure, which reduces the production costs (see (A.7), (A.9)). Further-
more, a marginal increase of the world market price of vulnerable positively affects the export 
of vulnerable (see (A5)). 
As the first bracket on the right hand side of condition (3.8) indicates, climate change has a 
direct and positive effect on optimal adaptation expenditure (see (A.9)) as well as an indirect 
and negative one, since climate change reduces the exports (see (A.6), (A.8)). Furthermore 
increasing world market prices stipulates autonomous adaptation, provided డ௔೙డ௭೙ 	് 0 (see A.5). 
Now, since డ௔೙డ௭೙ ൌ െ	
డమ௚೙
డ௔೙డ௭೙
డమ௚೙
డ௔೙మൗ  , this requires that, at optimum, marginal benefits of adapta-
tion డ௚೙డ௔೙ are not independent of exports.  
Adaptation funding crowds out autonomous adaptation, as condition (3.8) shows. As such the 
North has no economic incentive for funding adaptation in the South. Form the North’s per-
spective adaptation funding will pay only, if it affects the terms-of-trade. This is not the case, 
however, since optimal expenditure remains unchanged. Instead adaptation funding here turns 
out being some kind of income transfer from the North to the South. Through applying condi-
tion (3.6) we get from the budget constraint (2.3) 
  ݀ܿ௡ ൌ 	െ డ௚೙డொ ݀ܳ ൅ 	݀݌ሺݖ௡ െ ݔ௡ሻ െ	
డ௚೙
డ௔೙ ݀ܽ௡
௦ െ ݀ܽ௦௡. 
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The right side of the last equation consists of four terms, which indicate that a region’s wealth 
is directly affected by (1) climate change, (2) the terms-of-trade, and (3) the funding of adap-
tation, either, if the region is recipient (see the third term) or is donor (see the fourth term). 
More precisely, we have in case that North is the donor and South the recipient 
 ݀ܿே ൌ 	െ డ௚ಿడொ ݀ܳ ൅ 	݀݌ሺݖே െ ݔேሻ െ ݀ܽௌே, 
 ݀ܿௌ ൌ 	െ డ௚ೄడொ ݀ܳ ൅ 	݀݌ሺݖௌ െ ݔௌሻ െ	
డ௚ೄ
డ௔ೄ ݀ܽௌ
ே. 
Now, since changing transfers from North to the South do not change optimal adaptation, 
neither in the North nor in the South, funding adaptation has no effect, neither on terms-of 
trade nor regional production costs. Consequently, North would have cover a part of adapta-
tion expenditure in South without gaining any benefits, whereas in the recipient’s region the 
funding of adaptation works just like an untied income transfer. 
3.3 Funding adaptation 
The results from above suggest: If both regions are optimally adapted to climate change and 
variability, then it is not in the self-interest of the North to support strategically adaptation in 
the South. Generally it is argued, however, that although being more heavily exposed to the 
impacts of climate change, the developing countries do not own the necessary resources for 
coping with the associated risks (see Barrett, 2008). Or to phrase it differently: Countries in 
the South will not be able to optimally adapt to climate change on their own. Consequently it 
must be expected: (1) autonomous adaptation in the South remains sub-optimal. (2) Funding 
adaptation will not completely crowd out domestic adaptation, and hence, (3) funding adapta-
tion might take influence on terms-of-trade, from which the North could profit. As such fi-
nancing adaptation in the South would be a kind of facilitative adaptation. 
For testing this hypothesis, let us assume: 
Assumption 3: The South is not optimally adapted to climate change and does not extend it 
own adaptation expenditure. The North is optimally adapted and strategically invest-
ments into adaptation in the South. 
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This implies in particular: ݀ܽௌௌ ൌ 0, ݀ܽௌே ൌ ݀ܽௌ ൐ 0. And since we are interested in isolating 
the effects of funding adaptation in the South, for the sake of simplicity let us assume further: 
݀ܳ ൌ 0. Then, since  డ௭ೄడ௔ೄ ൐ 0 (see (A.7)), condition (3.4) implies 
(3.4b)  ௗ௣ௗ௔ೄ ൌ 	
ങ೥ೄ
ങೌೄ
ങೣಿ
ങ೛ ା
ങೣೄ
ങ೛ ି
ങ೥ಿ
ങ೛ ି
ങ೥ೄ
ങ೛
൏ 0. 
In words: If there is additional adaptation expenditure, marginal costs of producing vulnerable 
in the South will be reduced, which ceteris paribus implies falling world market prices  and 
rising exports from the South as will be shown in the following. Since there is no reallocation 
of capital across regions (see Appendix, Corollary 1) and since ݀ܳ ൌ 0, we obtain from con-
ditions (3.1) and (3.2) 
 ௗ௫೙ௗ௔ೄ ൌ
డ௫೙
డ௣
ௗ௣
ௗ௔ೄ ൐ 0, 
 ௗ௭ಿ	ௗ௔ೄ ൌ
డ௭ಿ
డ௣
ௗ௣
ௗ௔ೄ ൏ 0, 
 ௗ௭ೄ	ௗ௔ೄ ൌ
డ௭ೄ
డ௔ೄ ൅
డ௭ೄ
డ௣
ௗ௣
ௗ௔ೄ ൌ
ങ೥ೄ
ങೌೄቂ
ങೣಿ
ങ೛ ା
ങೣೄ
ങ೛ ି
ങ೥ಿ
ങ೛ ቃ
ങೣಿ
ങ೛ ା
ങೣೄ
ങ೛ ି
ങ೥ಿ
ങ೛ ି
ങ೥ೄ
ങ೛
൐ 0, 
 ௗ௭ೄ	ା	ௗ௭ಿ	ௗ௔ೄ ൌ
ങ೥ೄ
ങೌೄቂ
ങೣಿ
ങ೛ ା
ങೣೄ
ങ೛ ି
ങ೥ಿ
ങ೛ ቃ
ങೣಿ
ങ೛ ା
ങೣೄ
ങ೛ ି
ങ೥ಿ
ങ೛ ି
ങ೥ೄ
ങ೛
൅	
ങ೥ೄ
ങೌೄ
ങ೥ಿ
ങ೛
ങೣಿ
ങ೛ ା
ങೣೄ
ങ೛ ି
ങ೥ಿ
ങ೛ ି
ങ೥ೄ
ങ೛
൐ 0. 
These results are intuitively clear. Because of falling costs of producing vulnerable in the 
South, world market prices will fall, and hence, demand for vulnerable will rise in any region. 
Since there is no change in production costs in the North, exports are now reduced in that re-
gion, while in the South, where production of vulnerable became more profitable, production 
is extended.  
Finally, let us consider how strategic adaptation funding regional consumption and hence wel-
fare. In case of the North we obtain (see (2.3)) 
 ܿே ൌ ே݂ሺݔே, ݇ேሻ െ ݃ேሺܳ, ܽே, ݖேሻ െ ܽே െ ܽௌே ൅ ݌ሺݖே െ ݔேሻ ൅ ݎሺܭே െ ݇ேሻ. 
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Since it is assumed that the North is optimally adapted and ݀ܳ ൌ 0, profit maximization (see 
(3.1) – (3.3)) and condition (3.6) imply 
(3.9) ௗ௖ಿௗ௔ೄ ൌ
ௗ௣
ௗ௔ೄ ሺݖே െ ݔேሻ െ 1. 
Now, if the North is net-importer of vulnerable, i.e. ሺݖே െ ݔேሻ ൏ 0, because of declining 
world market prices (see condition (3.4b)), the North might profit from investing into the 
South’s adaptation infrastructure, if the resulting terms-of-trade effects are big enough. In 
contrast it is not clear a priory, how increasing adaptation expenditure will take influence on 
consumption in the South. Taking the total differential of the budget constraint now gives 
(3.10) ௗ௖ೄௗ௔ೄ ൌ െ
డ௚ೄ
డ௔ೄ ൅
ௗ௣
ௗ௔ೄ ሺݖௌ െ ݔௌሻ, 
which indicates that there are two countervailing effects. On the one hand, there is a positive 
effect on consumption and hence welfare, since the costs of producing vulnerable are reduced. 
This is reflected by the first term of the right side of condition (3.10). But on the other hand, if 
the South is net-exporter of vulnerable, declining world market prices reduce income in the 
South (see the second term of the right side of (3.10)).  
Now, remember that ௗ௣ௗ௔ೄ ሺݖே െ ݔேሻ ൅	
ௗ௣
ௗ௔ೄ ሺݖௌ െ ݔௌሻ ൌ 0. Consequently condition (3.10) turns 
into 
 ௗ௖ೄௗ௔ೄ ൌ െ
డ௚ೄ
డ௔ೄ െ	
ௗ௖ಿ
ௗ௔ೄ െ 1. 
Therefore, funding adaptation can be strictly Pareto-improving in the sense that marginal ef-
fects on consumption can be positive simultaneously in North and South only, if  െడ௚ೄడ௔ೄ ൐ 	1. 
This means, in the South the foreign financed adaptation expenditure must be below optimal 
autonomous ones (see condition (3.6)). And since (see condition (3.10)) 
 ௗ௖ೄௗ௔ೄ ൌ െ
డ௚ೄ
డ௔ೄ െ	
ௗ௣
ௗ௔ೄ ሺݖே െ ݔேሻ, 
welfare can be positive in the South only, if the gains from a reduction of production costs 
outrange the donor’s enrichment because of terms-of-trade effects. As such there are two 
messages: First, adaptation funding can be Pareto-improving only, if benefits of funding are 
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big enough. Given the usual properties of the cost function this implies that the level of adap-
tation is low in the recipient regions. Second, if not, the paradoxical effect of recipient im-
miserization through tied transfers can occur. 
4 Conclusions 
As our considerations indicate, economic losses, which climate change induces  in vulnerable 
sectors, among which agriculture, forestry and animal husbandry are the most important ones, 
can be limited through shifting to imports rather than producing these goods at home. Or to 
phrase it differently, trade can reduce the market damages of global climate change. The prob-
lem of the poor countries is, however, that they may face difficulties to increase export earn-
ings from other goods, which are necessary for paying for the additional imports. As Cline 
(2007) notes this gives the problem a “let them eat cake” flavor. And it implies in particular 
that if international trade is considered as mean of moderating the impacts of global warming, 
the corresponding terms-of-trade effects cannot be neglected. 
One option of how to reduce the economic impact of climate change is to financially assist the 
developing countries in adapting to climate change. This is of particular importance, since 
many of the poor countries of the South lack the necessary resources for adapting optimally to 
the risk of climate change. As our analysis reveals providing financial assistance for adapta-
tion can be Pareto-improving, if benefits of funding, i.e., damages, which are moderated 
through adaptation, are big enough, and if the recipient’s expenditure for adaptation is low. If 
not, the paradoxical effect of recipient immiserization through tied transfers can occur. 
Independent of that it must be mentioned that our analysis is based on the assumption that 
vulnerable products are traded on open and perfect world markets. Reality is far away from 
such a situation. In particular, this is not the case regarding international trade of agricultural 
products. For example, in 1973 the United States imposed an embargo on soybean exports in 
order to avoid inflationary effects of rising prices, and many nations are inclined to impose 
agricultural import barriers in the name of food self-sufficiency. 
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 Appendix 1 
Remember: ݇௡ ൌ ܭ௡ሺݎ, ݔ௡ሻ , ݔ௡ ൌ ܺ௡ሺ	݌, ݇௡ሻ , ݖ௡ ൌ ܼ௡ሺܳ, ܽ௡, ݌ሻ , ܽ௡ ൌ ܣ௡ሺܳ, ݖ௡ሻ . If As-
sumption 1 is fulfilled, this implies for ݊ ൌ ܰ, ܵ 
(A1) డ௞೙డ௥ ൌ
ଵ
ങమ೑೙
ങೖ೙మ
൏ 0, 
(A2) డ௫೙డ௣ ൌ
ଵ
ങమ೑೙
ങೣ೙మ
൏ 0, 
(A3) డ௞೙డ௫೙ ൌ െ
ങమ೑೙
ങೣ೙ങೖ೙
ങమ೑೙
ങೖ೙మ
൐ 0 
(A4) డ௫೙డ௞೙ ൌ െ
ങమ೑೙
ങೣ೙ങೖ೙
ങమ೑೙
ങೣ೙మ
൐ 0 
(A5) డ௭೙డ௣ ൌ
ଵ
ങమ೒೙
ങ೥೙మ
൐ 0, 
(A6) డ௭೙డொ ൌ െ	
ങమ೒೙
ങ೥೙ങೂ
ങమ೒೙
ങ೥೙మ
൏ 0, 
(A7) డ௭೙డ௔೙ ൌ െ	
ങమ೒೙
ങ೥೙ങೌ೙
ങమ೒೙
ങ೥೙మ
൐ 0, 
(A.8) డ௔೙డ௭೙ ൌ െ	
ങమ೒೙
ങೌ೙ങ೥೙
ങమ೒೙
ങೌ೙మ
൐ 0, 
(A.9) డ௔೙డொ ൌ െ	
ങమ೒೙
ങೂങ೥೙
ങమ೒೙
ങೌ೙మ
൐ 0,  
Finally note that 
(A8) ሺ డమ௙೙డ௫೙௞೙ሻ
ଶ ൌ 	 డమ௙೙డ௞೙మ
డమ௙೙
డ௫೙మ ,  
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which, because of the linear homogeneity of the production function ௡݂, ݊ ൌ ܰ, ܵ,	 directly 
follows from Euler’s equation. 
Proposition 1: Let sectors behave as price takers and let the world markets both for vulnera-
ble and capital be in equilibrium. Then  
(3.4)  ቀడ௭ಿడ௣ ൅
డ௭ೄ
డ௣ െ
డ௫ಿ
డ௣ െ
డ௫ೄ
డ௣ ቁ ݀݌ ൌ 	 ቀ
డ௭ಿ
డொ ൅
డ௭ೄ
డொ ቁ ݀ܳ ൅	
డ௭ಿ
డ௔ಿ ݀ܽே ൅
డ௭ೄ
డ௔ೄ ݀ܽௌ.  
Proof: By taking the total differential of condition (2.1) we get 
 ቀడ௭ಿడொ ൅
డ௭ೄ
డொ ቁ ݀ܳ ൅
డ௭ಿ
డ௔ಿ ݀ܽே ൅
డ௭ೄ
డ௔ೄ ݀ܽௌ െ
డ௫ಿ
డ௞ಿ ݀݇ே െ
డ௫ೄ
డ௞ೄ ݀݇ௌ ൌ 
 ቀడ௭ಿడ௣ ൅
డ௭ೄ
డ௣ െ
డ௫ಿ
డ௣ െ
డ௫ೄ
డ௣ ቁ ݀݌ 
or, since ݀݇ே ൌ 	െ݀݇ௌ (see condition (2.2)) 
 ቀడ௭ಿడொ ൅
డ௭ೄ
డொ ቁ ݀ܳ ൅
డ௭ಿ
డ௔ಿ ݀ܽே ൅
డ௭ೄ
డ௔ೄ ݀ܽௌ െ ሺ
డ௫ಿ
డ௞ಿ െ
డ௫ೄ
డ௞ೄሻ݀݇ே ൌ 
 ቀడ௭ಿడ௣ ൅
డ௭ೄ
డ௣ െ
డ௫ಿ
డ௣ െ
డ௫ೄ
డ௣ ቁ ݀݌ 
Next recall that condition (3.3) implies 
 డ௙ಿడ௞ಿ ሺݔே, ݇ேሻ ൌ
డ௙ೄ
డ௞ೄ ሺݔௌ, ݇ௌሻ, 
hence by taking the total differential 
 డ
మ௙ಿ
డ௞మಿ ݀݇ே ൅
డమ௙ಿ
డ௫ಿడ௞ಿ ݀ݔே ൌ
డమ௙ೄ
డ௞ೄమ
݀݇ௌ ൅ డ
మ௙ೄ
డ௫ೄడ௞ೄ ݀ݔௌ. 
Now, since ݀ݔ௡ ൌ డ௫೙డ௞೙ ݀݇௡ ൅
డ௫೙
డ௣ ݀݌ and since conditions (A4) and (A8) together imply  
 డ
మ௙೙
డ௫೙డ௞೙
డ௫೙
డ௞೙ ൌ െ
డమ௙೙
డ௞೙మ , 
we observe 
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(A9) డ
మ௙ಿ
డ௫ಿడ௞ಿ
డ௫ಿ
డ௣ ݀݌ ൌ
డమ௙ೄ
డ௫ೄడ௞ೄ
డ௫ೄ
డ௣ ݀݌, 
which means (see (A2) and (A4)) 
(A10) డ௫ಿడ௞ಿ ൌ 	
డ௫ೄ
డ௞ೄ. 
Consequently 
 ݀݌ ൌ 	
ങ೥ಿ
ങೂ ା
ങ೥ೄ
ങೂ
ങೣಿ
ങ೛ ା
ങೣೄ
ങ೛ ି
ങ೥ಿ
ങ೛ ି
ങ೥ೄ
ങ೛
݀ܳ ൅	
ങ೥ಿ
ങೌಿ
ങೣಿ
ങ೛ ା
ങೣೄ
ങ೛ ି
ങ೥ಿ
ങ೛ ି
ങ೥ೄ
ങ೛
݀ܽே ൅
ങ೥ೄ
ങೌೄ
ങೣಿ
ങ೛ ା
ങೣೄ
ങ೛ ି
ങ೥ಿ
ങ೛ ି
ങ೥ೄ
ങ೛
݀ܽௌ. 
 
Corollary 1: Let sectors behave as price takers and let the world markets both for vulnerable 
and capital be in equilibrium. Then a marginal change in means of temperature and /or 
adaptation expenditure does not imply a reallocation of capital.  
Proof: Consider the first order conditions 
(3.1) డ௙೙డ௫೙ ሺݔ௡, ݇௡ሻ െ ݌ ൌ 0, ݊ ൌ ܰ, ܵ, 
(3.3) డ௙೙డ௞೙ ሺݔ௡, ݇௡ሻ െ ݎ ൌ 0, ݊ ൌ ܰ, ܵ. 
which implies 
 డ௙ಿడ௫ಿ െ	
డ௙ೄ
డ௫ೄ ൌ 0 
 డ௙ಿడ௞ಿ െ	
డ௙ೄ
డ௞ೄ ൌ 0. 
By taking the total differential and by taking into account that ݀݇ே ൌ ݀݇ௌ, this gives the fol-
lowing system  
 ൮
డమ௙ಿ
డ௫మಿ
డమ௙ಿ
డ௫ಿడ௞ಿ ൅
డమ௙ೄ
డ௫ೄడ௞ೄ	
డమ௙ಿ
డ௫ಿడ௞ಿ
డమ௙ಿ
డ௞మಿ ൅	
డమ௙ೄ
డ௞ೄమ
	
൲ ൬݀ݔே݀݇ே൰ ൌ 	ቌ
డమ௙ೄ
డ௫ೄమ
డమ௙ೄ
డ௫ೄడ௞ೄ
ቍ݀ݔௌ. 
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Let A denote the determinate of the above matrix, i.e. ܤ ൌ	 డమ௙ಿడ௫మಿ
డమ௙ೄ
డ௞ೄమ
െ	 డమ௙ಿడ௫ಿడ௞ಿ
డమ௙ೄ
డ௫ೄడ௞ೄ, which 
under the usual condition that cross derivatives do not dominate is positive. Then by using 
Cramer’s rule, we obtain 
 ݀݇ே ൌ 	 ଵ஻ ൤
డమ௙ಿ
డ௫మಿ
డమ௙ೄ
డ௫ೄడ௞ೄ െ
డమ௙ಿ
డ௫ಿడ௞ಿ
డమ௙ೄ
డ௫ೄమ
൨ ݀ݔௌ. 
Condition (A9), however, implies డ
మ௙ಿ
డ௫మಿ
డమ௙ೄ
డ௫ೄడ௞ೄ െ
డమ௙ಿ
డ௫ಿడ௞ಿ
డమ௙ೄ
డ௫ೄమ
ൌ 0, and hence ݀݇ே ൌ 0.  
